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Abstract
A black-box secret sharing scheme for the threshold access structure
Tt,n is one which works over any finite Abelian group G. Briefly, such
a scheme differs from an ordinary linear secret sharing scheme (over,
say, a given finite field) in that distribution matrix and reconstruction
vectors are defined over Z and are designed independently of the group
G from which the secret and the shares are sampled. This means that
perfect completeness and perfect privacy are guaranteed regardless of
which group G is chosen. We define the black-box secret sharing prob-
lem as the problem of devising, for an arbitrary given Tt,n, a scheme
with minimal expansion factor, i.e., where the length of the full vector
of shares divided by the number of players n is minimal.
Such schemes are relevant for instance in the context of distributed
cryptosystems based on groups with secret or hard to compute group
order. A recent example is secure general multi-party computation
over black-box rings.
In 1994 Desmedt and Frankel have proposed an elegant approach
to the black-box secret sharing problem based in part on polynomial
interpolation over cyclotomic number fields. For arbitrary given Tt,n
with 0 < t < n− 1, the expansion factor of their scheme is O(n). This
is the best previous general approach to the problem.
Using low degree integral extensions of Z over which there exists a
pair of sufficiently large Vandermonde matrices with co-prime deter-
minants, we construct, for arbitrary given Tt,n with 0 < t < n− 1 , a
black-box secret sharing scheme with expansion factor O(log n), which
we show is minimal.
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1 Introduction
A black-box secret sharing scheme for the threshold access structure Tt,n is
one which works over any finite Abelian group G. Briefly, such a scheme
differs from an ordinary linear secret sharing scheme (over, say, a given finite
field; see e.g. [Bla79, Sha79, Bri89, BI92, BL88, KW93, Gal95, Bei96, Dij97,
CDM00]) in that distribution matrix and reconstruction vectors are defined
over Z and are designed independently of the group G from which the secret
and the shares may be sampled. In other words, the dealer computes the
shares for the n players as Z-linear combinations of the secret group element
of his interest and secret randomizing group elements, and reconstruction of
the secret from the shares held by a large enough set of players is by taking
Z-linear combinations over those shares. Note that each player may receive
one or more group elements as his share in the secret. Perfect completeness
and perfect privacy are guaranteed regardless of which group G is chosen.
Here, perfect completeness means that the secret is uniquely determined by
the joint shares of at least t + 1 players, and perfect privacy means that
the joint shares of at most t players contain no Shannon information at all
about the secret of interest. Note that these schemes are homomorphic in
the sense that the sum of share vectors is a share vector for the sum of the
corresponding secrets.
We define the black-box secret sharing problem as the problem of de-
vising, for an arbitrary given Tt,n, a scheme with minimal expansion factor,
i.e., where the length of the full vector of shares divided by the number of
players n is minimized. Note the case t = n− 1 is easily solved by “additive
n-out-of-n sharing,” which has expansion factor 1. The cases t = 0, n have
no meaning for secret sharing. For the rest of this discussion we assume
0 < t < n− 1.
Black-box secret sharing schemes were first considered by Desmedt and
Frankel [DF89] in the context of distributed cryptosystems based on groups
with secret order. Shamir’s polynomial based secret sharing scheme over fi-
nite fields [Sha79] cannot immediately be adapted to the setting of black-box
secret sharing. In [DF94], Desmedt and Frankel [DF94] showed a black-box
secret sharing scheme that elegantly circumvents integer polynomial inter-
polation problems by passing to an integral extension ring of Z over which a
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sufficiently large invertible Vandermonde matrix exists. Their construction
is then completed on account of the fact that (sufficiently many copies of) an
arbitrary Abelian group can be viewed as a module over such an extension
ring.
For a given commutative ring S with 1, the largest integer l such that
there exists an invertible l×l Vandermonde matrix with entries in S is called
the Lenstra constant l(S) of the ring S. Equivalently, l(S) is the maximal
size of a subset E of S that is “exceptional” in that for all α,α′ ∈ E, α 6= α′,
it holds that α− α′ is a unit of S.
Given an integral extension ring S of degree m over Z, they construct
a black-box secret sharing scheme with expansion factor m for a threshold
access structure on at most l(S) − 1 players. For any prime p, Lenstra’s
constant for the ring of integers of the pth cyclotomic number field is p. 1
Given an arbitrary Tt,n and choosing S as the ring of integers of the pth
cyclotomic number field, where p is the smallest prime greater than n, they
construct a black-box secret sharing scheme for Tt,n with expansion factor
between n and 2n. This is the best previous general approach to the problem.
Further progress on the black-box secret sharing problem via the approach
of [DF94] depends on the problem of finding for each n an extension whose
degree is substantially smaller than n and whose Lenstra constant is greater
than n. To the best of our knowledge, this is an open problem of algebraic
number theory (see also [DF94] and the references therein).
Except for some quite special cases, namely when t is constant or when t
(resp. n−t) is small compared to n [DCB94, BBDW96] or the constant factor
gain from [DKKK98], no substantial improvement on the general black-box
secret sharing problem has been reported since.
Our result builds on [DF94] in that we also study the problem over
certain integral extensions. However, we avoid dependence on Lenstra’s
constant altogether. Namely, we exhibit low degree integral extensions of
Z over which there exists a pair of sufficiently large Vandermonde matrices
with co-prime determinants and show how this allows us to construct, for
arbitrary given Tt,n, a black-box secret sharing scheme with expansion factor
O(log n). Using a result of Karchmer and Wigderson [KW93], we show that
this is minimal.
1It is not hard to find an exceptional set of size p in this ring. To see that the maximal
size of such a set is p, let K be a number field of degree m, and let ZK denote its ring
of algebraic integers. For an arbitrary non-trivial ideal I of ZK , it is easy to see that
l(ZK) ≤ |ZK/I | (≤ 2m). In the case where K is the pth cyclotomic number field, the
integer prime p totally ramifies. Hence l(ZK) ≤ |ZK/P | = p, where P is the unique prime
ideal of ZK lying above p.
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There are several applications of black-box secret sharing schemes. For
instance, the result of [DF94] is exploited in [DDFY94] to obtain an efficient
and secure solution for sharing any function out of a certain abstract class of
functions, including RSA. The interest in application of the result of [DF94]
to practical distributed RSA-based protocols seems to have decreased some-
what due to recent developments, see for instance [Sho00] and the references
therein. However, apart from the fact that optimal black-box secret shar-
ing is perhaps interesting in its own right, we note that in [CFIK02] our
black-box secret sharing scheme is applied in protocols for secure general
multi-party computation over black-box rings. Also, optimal black-box se-
cret sharing may very well be relevant to new distributed cryptographic
schemes for instance based on class groups.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a formalization
of the notion of black-box secret sharing, and show a natural correspondence
between such schemes and integer span programs (ISPs). This generalizes
the well-known correspondence between monotone span programs over finite
fields [KW93] and linear secret sharing schemes over finite fields. In Sec-
tion 3 we show lower bounds on the size of ISPs computing threshold access
structures. Our main result is presented in Section 4, where we construct
an ISP with minimal size for an arbitrary given threshold access structure.
This leads to an optimal black-box secret sharing scheme for an arbitrary
given threshold access structure.
2 Black-Box Secret Sharing
2.1 Definition
We give a formal definition that exactly captures the intuition behind black-
box secret sharing over Abelian groups.
Definition 1 A monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n} is a non-empty
collection Γ of sets A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that ∅ 6∈ Γ and such that for all
A ∈ Γ and for all sets B with A ⊂ B ⊂ {1, . . . , n} it holds that B ∈ Γ.
Definition 2 Let t and n be integers with 0 < t < n. The threshold access
structure Tt,n is the collection of sets A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |A| > t. 2
Let Γ be a monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n}. Let M ∈ Zd,e be an
integer matrix, and let ψ : {1, . . . , d} → {1, . . . , n} be a surjective function.
2Note that some authors define Tt,n as consisting of all sets of size at least t. Our
definition adheres to a convention in the multi-party computation literature.
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We say that the jth row (j = 1 . . . d) of M is labelled by ψ(j) or that
“ψ(j) owns the jth row.” For A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, MA denotes the restriction
of M to the rows jointly owned by A. Write dA for the number of rows
in MA. Similarly, for x ∈ Zd, xA ∈ ZdA denotes the restriction of x to
the coordinates jointly owned by A. For each A ∈ Γ, let λ(A) ∈ ZdA be
an integer (column-) vector. We call this the reconstruction vector for A.
Collect all these vectors in a set R.
Definition 3 Let Γ be a monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n}, and let
B = (M,ψ,R) be as defined above. B is called an integer Γ-scheme. Its
expansion rate is defined as d/n, where d is the number of rows of M .
Let G be a finite Abelian group. We use additive notation for its group
operation, and use 0G to denote its neutral element. The group G is of course
a Z-module (see e.g. [Lang]), by defining the map Z×G→ G, (µ, g) 7→ µ ·g,
where 0·g = 0G, µ·g = g+. . .+g (µ times) for µ > 0 and µ·g = −((−µ)·g) for
µ < 0. 3 We also write µg or gµ instead of µ · g. Note that it is well-defined
how an integer matrix acts on a vector of group elements.
Definition 4 Let Γ be a monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n} and let
B = (M,ψ,R) be an integer Γ-scheme. Then B is a black-box secret sharing
scheme for Γ if the following holds. Let G be an arbitrary finite Abelian group
G, and let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be an arbitrary non-empty set. For arbitrarily
distributed s ∈ G, let g = (g1, . . . , ge)T ∈ Ge be drawn uniformly at random,
subject to g1 = s. Define s = Mg. Then:
• (Completeness) If A ∈ Γ, then sTA · λ(A) = s with probability 1, where
λ(A) ∈ R is the reconstruction vector for A.
• (Privacy) If A 6∈ Γ, then sA contains no Shannon information on s.
Note that these schemes 4 are homomorphic in the sense that the sum
s + s′ of two share vectors s and s′, is a share vector for the sum s + s′ of
their corresponding secrets s and s′.
2.2 Monotone Span Programs over Rings
In this section we provide quite natural necessary and sufficient conditions
under which an integer Γ-scheme is a black-box secret sharing scheme for Γ.
3If the group operation in G is efficient, multiplication by an integer can also be effi-
ciently implemented using standard “double-and-add.”
4See [Kin00] for an equivalent definition.
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To this end, we introduce the notion of monotone span programs over rings.
This is a certain variation of monotone span programs over finite fields,
introduced by Karchmer and Wigderson [KW93]. These are well-known to
have a natural one-to-one correspondence with linear secret sharing schemes
over finite fields (see e.g. [Gal95, Bei96]). Monotone span programs over Z
(ISPs) will turn out to have a similar correspondence with black-box secret
sharing schemes. We also show an efficient conversion of a monotone span
program over an integral extension ring of Z to an ISP.
As an aside, monotone span programs over rings are the basis for multi-
party computation over black-box rings, as studied in [CFIK02]. In partic-
ular, the techniques of [CDM00] for secure multiplication and VSS apply to
this flavor of monotone span program as well.
Throughout this paper, S denotes a (not necessarily finite) commutative
ring with 1. Let Γ be a monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n}, and let
M ∈ Sd,e be a matrix whose d rows are labelled by a surjective function
ψ : {1, . . . , d} → {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 5 ε = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ Se is called the target vector. M =
(S,M,ψ, ε) is called a monotone span program (over the ring S). If S = Z, it
is called an integer span program, or ISP, for short. We define size(M) = d,
where d is the number of rows of M .
For N ∈ Sa,b, imN denotes its column space, i.e., the space of all vectors
Nx ∈ Sa, where x ranges over Sb, and kerN denotes its null-space, i.e., the
space of all vectors x ∈ Sb with Nx = 0 ∈ Sa.
Definition 6 As above, let Γ be a monotone access structure and let M =
(S,M,ψ, ε) be a monotone span program over S. Then M is a monotone
span program for Γ, if for all A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} the following holds.
• If A ∈ Γ, then ε ∈ imMTA .
• If A 6∈ Γ, then there exists κ = (κ1, . . . , κe)T ∈ kerMA with κ1 = 1.
We also say that M computes Γ.
If S is a field, our definition is equivalent to the computational model
of monotone span programs over fields [KW93]. Indeed, this model is char-
acterized by the condition that A ∈ Γ if and only if ε ∈ imMTA . The
equivalence follows from the remark below.
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Remark 1 By basic linear algebra, if S is a field, then ε 6∈ imMTA implies
that there exists κ ∈ kerMA with κ1 = 1. If S is not a field this does
not necessarily hold. 5 The implication in the other direction trivially holds
regardless of S.
Using (generally inefficient) representations of monotone access struc-
tures as monotone Boolean formulas and using induction in a similar style
as in e.g. [BL88], it is straightforward to verify that for all Γ and for all S,
there is a monotone span program over S that computes Γ.
Definition 7 For any Γ and for any S, mspS(Γ) denotes the minimal size
of a monotone span program over S computing Γ. If S = Z, we write isp(Γ).
Define a non-degenerate monotone span program as one for which the
rows of M span the target-vector. As opposed to the case of fields, a non-
degenerate monotone span program over a ring need not compute any mono-
tone access structure. This is of no concern here, though.
The following proposition characterizes black-box secret sharing schemes
in terms of ISPs.
Proposition 1 Let Γ be a monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n}, and let
B = (M,ψ,R) be an integer Γ-scheme. Then B is a black-box secret sharing
scheme for Γ if and only if M = (Z,M,ψ, ε) is an ISP for Γ and for all
A ∈ Γ, its reconstruction vector λ(A) ∈ R satisfies MTAλ(A) = ε.
Proof. The argument that the stated ISP is sufficient for black-box
secret sharing is quite similar to the well-known case of linear secret sharing
over finite fields. The other direction of the implication follows in essence
from Lemma 1 below. We include full details for convenience.
Consider the ISP from the statement of the proposition, together with
the assumption on the reconstruction vectors. Consider an arbitrary set
A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and an arbitrary finite Abelian group G. Define s = Mg
for arbitrary g = (s, g2, . . . , ge)T ∈ Ge. Suppose A ∈ Γ, and let λ(A) ∈ R
be its reconstruction vector. It follows that sTAλ(A) = (MAg)
T λ(A) =
gT (MTA λ(A)) = g
T ε = s. Thus the completeness condition from Defi-
nition 4 is satisfied. If A 6∈ Γ, then there exists κ ∈ Ze with MAκ =
0 ∈ ZdA and κ1 = 1, by Definition 6. For arbitrary s′ ∈ G, define
s′ = s +M(g + (s′ − s)κ) ∈ GdA . The secret defined by s′ equals s′, while
on the other hand s′A = sA. This implies perfect privacy: the assignment
5Consider for example the integer matrix M = (2 0).
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g′ = g + (s′ − s)κ provides a bijection between the set of possible vectors
of “coins” consistent with sA and s, and the set of those consistent with sA
and s′. Therefore, the privacy condition from Definition 4 is also satisfied.
In the other direction of the proposition, we start with a black-box se-
cret sharing scheme for Γ according to Definition 4. Consider an arbitrary
set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Suppose A ∈ Γ, and let λ(A) ∈ R be its reconstruc-
tion vector. For an arbitrary prime p, set G = Zp. By the completeness
condition from Definition 4, it follows that (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ≡ (MAIe)T λ(A) ≡
MTAλ(A) mod p, where Ie ∈ Ze,ep is the identity matrix. This holds for all
primes p. Hence, MTAλ(A) = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
T = ε. Therefore, the condition
on the sets A ∈ Γ in Definition 6 and the condition on the reconstruction
vectors R from the statement of the proposition are satisfied.
To conclude the proof we show that the privacy condition from Defi-
nition 4 implies the condition on the sets A 6∈ Γ from Definition 6. The
following formulation is equivalent. Let y ∈ ZdA denote the left-most col-
umn of MA, and let NA ∈ ZdA,e−1 denote the remaining e−1 columns. Then
it is to be shown that the linear systems of equations NAx = y is solvable
over Z.
By Lemma 1 below, it is sufficient to show that this holds modulo m,
for all m ∈ Z, m 6= 0. With notation as in Definition 4 and considering
G = Zm, it follows from the privacy condition that there exists g′ ∈ Zem
such that g′1 ≡ s − 1 and sA ≡ MAg′. Setting κ ≡ g − g′ ∈ Zem, we have
MAκ ≡ 0 with κ1 ≡ 1. In other words, NAx = y is solvable over Zm for all
integers m 6= 0. 4
We note that [Kin00] also discusses a characterization. Although there
are some similarities in the technical analysis, the conditions stated there
are still in terms of the black-box secret sharing scheme, rather than by
providing simple algebraic conditions on the matrix M as we do. Therefore,
we feel that our approach based on integer span programs is perhaps more
useful and insightful, especially since monotone span programs over finite
fields have since long been known to be equivalent to linear secret sharing
schemes over finite fields.
Lemma 1 Let N ∈ Za,b and y ∈ Za. Then the linear system of equations
Nx = y is solvable over Z if and only if it is solvable over Zm for all integers
m 6= 0.
Proof. The forward direction of the proposition is trivial. In the other
direction, consider the Z-moduleH generated by the columns of N . By basic
theory of Z-modules (see e.g. [Lang]), there exists a Z-basis B = (b1, . . . ,ba)
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of Za, and non-zero integers a1, . . . , al such that BH = (a1b1, . . . , albl) is
a Z-basis of H. Let L denote the Z-module with basis BL = (b1, . . . ,bl).
Note that H ⊂ L. Let p be an arbitrary prime, and let (·) denote reduction
modulo p. Since the determinant of B is ±1, B (resp. BL) provides a basis
for the vector-space Fap (resp. the vector-space L). Note that BL ⊂ B.
It follows from the assumptions that y ∈ H ⊂ L. Let (y1, . . . , ya) ∈ Za
denote the coordinates of y wrt. B. Since the latter observation holds for
all primes p, it follows that yl+1 = . . . = ya = 0. Hence, y ∈ L. Now
set m̂ =
∏l
i=1 ai. By the assumptions, there exists cm̂ ∈ Za such that
y + m̂ · cm̂ ∈ H. Therefore, m̂ · cm̂ ∈ L, and by the definition of L, cm̂ ∈ L.
By the choice of m̂, it follows that m̂ · cm̂ ∈ H. We conclude that y ∈ H, as
desired. 4
Remark 2 Let M = (S,M,ψ, ε) compute Γ. If S is a field or a principal
ideal domain (such as Z), then we may assume without loss of generality
that e ≤ d, i.e., there are at most as many columns in M as there are rows.
This is easily shown using elementary linear algebra, and using the basic
properties of modules over principal ideal domains (see e.g. [Lang] and the
proof of Lemma 1). Briefly, sinceM is non-degenerate, the last statement in
Remark 1 implies that the space generated by the 2nd up to the eth column
of M does not contain even a non-zero multiple of the first column. Without
changing the access structure that is computed, we can always replace the
2nd up to the eth column of M by any set of vectors that generates the
same space. If S is a field or a principal ideal domain, this space has a basis
of cardinality at most d− 1.
Remark 3 We may now identify a black-box secret sharing scheme for Γ
with an ISP M = (Z,M,ψ, ε) for Γ. A reconstruction vector for A ∈ Γ
is simply any vector λ(A) ∈ ZdA such that MTAλ(A) = ε. Note that the
expansion rate of the corresponding black-box secret sharing scheme is equal
to size(M)/n. By Remark 2 it uses at most size(M) random group elements.
We now state some lemmas that are useful in the sequel.
Definition 8 The dual Γ∗ of a monotone access structure Γ on {1, . . . , n}
is the collection of sets A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that Ac 6∈ Γ.
Note that Γ∗ is a monotone access structure on {1, . . . , n}, that (Γ∗)∗ = Γ
and that (Tt,n)∗ = Tn−t−1,n. The lemma below generalizes a similar property
shown in [KW93] for the case of fields.
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Lemma 2 mspS(Γ) = mspS(Γ∗), for all S and Γ.
Proof. Let M = (S,M,ψ, ε) be a monotone span program for Γ.
Select an arbitrary generating set of vectors b1, . . . ,bl for kerMT , and
choose λ with MT λ = ε. Let M∗ be the matrix defined by the l + 1
columns (λ,b1,b2, . . . ,bl), and use ψ to label M∗ as well. Define M∗ =
(S,M∗, ψ, ε∗), where ε∗ = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ Sl+1. Note that size(M∗) =
size(M). We claim that M∗ computes Γ∗. This is easy to verify.
If Ac 6∈ Γ, then by Definition 6, there exists κ ∈ Sl+1 such thatMAcκ = 0
and κ1 = 1. Define λ∗ = MAκ. Then (M∗)TAλ
∗ = ((M∗)T ·M)κ = ε∗. On
the other hand, if Ac ∈ Γ, then there exists λ̂ ∈ Sd such that MT λ̂ = ε and
λ̂A = 0. By definition of M∗, there exists κ ∈ Sl+1 such that M∗κ = λ̂ and
κ1 = 1. Hence, M∗Aκ = λ̂A = 0 and κ1 = 1. This concludes the proof. 4
The lemma below holds in a more general setting, but we tailor it to
ours.
Lemma 3 Let f(X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic, irreducible polynomial. Write m =
deg(f). Consider the ring S = Z[X]/(f(X)). Suppose M = (S,M,ψ, ε) is
a monotone span program over S for a monotone access structure Γ. Then
there exists an ISP M̂ = (Z, M̂ , ψ̂, ε̂) for Γ with size(M̂) = m · size(M).
Proof. The proof is based on a standard algebraic technique for rep-
resenting a linear map defined over an extension ring in terms of a linear
map defined over the ground ring. This technique is also used in [KW93] for
monotone span programs over extension fields. Since our definition of mono-
tone span programs over rings differs slightly from the definitions in [KW93],
we explain it in detail.
Note that S is a commutative ring with 1 and that it has no zero divisors,
but that it is not a field. Fix w ∈ S such that f(w) = 0 (such as w = X ,
the class of X modulo f(X)). Then for each x ∈ S, there exists ~x =
(x0, . . . , xm−1) ∈ Zm such that x = x0 · 1 + x1 · w + · · · + xm−1 · wm−1.
This vector, which we will view as a row-vector, is unique. In other words,
W = {1, w, . . . , wm−1} is a Z-basis for S. As before, write d (resp. e) for
the number of rows (resp. columns) of M . Fix an arbitrary set B ∈ Γ and
write dB for the number of rows of MB . Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λdB )
T ∈ SdB be
such that MTBλ = ε ∈ Se. Let ~λi ∈ Zm denote the coordinates of λi ∈ S
wrt. W, i = 1 . . . dB . Also fix an arbitrary set A 6∈ Γ, and write dA for the
number of rows of MA. Let κ = (κ1, κ2, . . . , κe)T ∈ Se be such that κ1 = 1
and MAκ = 0 ∈ SdA , and let ~κi ∈ Zm denote the coordinates of κi wrt. W,
i = 1 . . . e.
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Define the monotone span program M = (S,M, ψ̂, ε) as follows. To
define M , replace each row r of the matrix M by the matrix consisting of
the m rows 1 · r, w · r, . . . , wm−1 · r, where the labeling ψ is extended to
ψ̂ so that these m rows of M have the same label as r in M . Note that
M ∈ Smd,e. To verify that M = (S,M, ψ̂, ε) is a monotone span program
for Γ as well, note that
M
T
B(~λ1, . . . , ~λdB )
T = ε ∈ Se and MAκ = 0 ∈ SmdA .
We define the ISP M̂ = (Z, M̂ , ψ̂, ε̂) as follows. First, define a new target
vector ε̂ = (1, 0 . . . , 0)T ∈ Zme. Next, construct, M̂ ∈ Zmd,me from M , by
replacing each entry x in M by the row-vector ~x ∈ Zm, its coordinate vector
wrt. W. Note that
M̂TB (~λ1, . . . , ~λdB )
T = ε̂ ∈ Zme.
Consider arbitrary u, v ∈ S, and let ~u,~v ∈ Zm be their respective coordinate
vectors wrt. W. It is straightforward that there exist V0, . . . , Vm−1 ∈ Zm,m,
only depending on W, such that, for i = 0 . . . m − 1, ~uVi~vT ∈ Z is the i-
th coordinate of u · v ∈ S, when written in coordinates wrt. W. By the
particular choice of W we must have V0(1, 0, . . . , 0)T = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T . Then
M̂A(1, 0, . . . , 0, ~y2, . . . , ~ye)T = 0 ∈ ZmdA ,
where, for i = 2 . . . e,
~yi = ~κiV T0 ∈ Zm.
Hence, M̂ = (Z, M̂ , ψ̂, ε̂) is an ISP for Γ. As an aside, note that we may
delete the 2nd up to mth leftmost colums of M̂ and the corresponding
coordinates of ε̂ without penalty. Hence, 1 + m(e − 1) columns suffice,
rather than me. 4
3 Lower Bounds for the Threshold Case
In this section we prove 6
Proposition 2 For all integers t, n with 0 < t < n − 1, it holds that
isp(Tt,n) = Ω(n · log n). Consequently, the expansion factor of a black-box
secret sharing scheme for Tt,n with 0 < t < n− 1 is Ω(log n).
6Note that isp(Tn−1,n) = n: the case t = n−1 is solved by simple additive “n-out-of-n
secret sharing.”
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Proposition 2 follows quite directly from the bound shown in Theorem 1
for binary monotone span programs, as proved in [KW93]. Before we give
the details of the proof of Proposition 2, we include a proof of their bound
for convenience. Note that we have made constants for their asymptotic
bound explicit.
Throughout this section, K denotes a field. Let M = (K,M,ψ, ε) be
a non-degenerate monotone span program. The access structure of M,
denoted Γ(M), is the collection of sets A such that ε ∈ imMTA . Note that
by Remark 1 this is consistent with our Definition 6. We write msp2(Γ)
instead of mspF2(Γ).
Proposition 3 [KW93] msp2(T1,n) ≥ n · log n.
Proof. Consider a monotone span program M = (F2,M,ψ, ε) such
that Γ(M) = T1,n. Define e as the number of columns of M , d as its number
of rows, and di as the number of rows of Mi for i = 1 . . . n, where we write
Mi instead of M{i} and di instead of d{i}. Without loss of generality, assume
that the rows of each Mi are linearly independent over F2. Let H1 collect
the vectors in Fe2 with first coordinate equal to 1. Since {i} 6∈ T1,n, Remark 1
implies that |kerMi∩H1| 6= ∅. By assumption on Mi, |kerMi∩H1| = 2e−1−di
for i = 1 . . . n. On the other hand, {i, j} ∈ T1,n. Hence, by Remark 1, we
have kerMi ∩ kerMj ∩H1 = ∅, for all i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. By counting
and normalizing, 2−d1 + · · · + 2−dn ≤ 1. By the Log Sum Inequality (see
e.g. [CT]), d = d1 + · · ·+ dn ≥ n log n. 4
Theorem 1 [KW93] n · (blog nc+ 1) ≥ msp2(Tt,n) ≥ n+32 · log n+32 , for all
t, n with 0 < t < n− 1.
Proof. The upper bound, which is not needed for our purposes, follows
by considering an appropriate Vandermonde matrix over the field F2u , where
u = (blog nc + 1). This is turned into a binary monotone span program
for Tt,n using a similar conversion technique as in Lemma 3. As to the
lower bound, note that we may assume t ≥ (n − 1)/2, since msp2(Tt,n) =
msp2(Tn−t−1,n) by Lemma 2.
Then
msp2(Tt,n) ≥ msp2(Tt,t+2) = msp2(T1,t+2) ≥
(t+ 2) log(t+ 2) ≥ n+ 3
2
· log n+ 3
2
.
The first inequality follows by “deleting sufficiently many blocks M{i} from a
monotone span program,” the equality is implied by Lemma 2, the second to
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last inequality follows from Proposition 3, and the last one by the assumption
on t 4
For the proof of Proposition 2, let an ISP for Tt,n be given, and consider
the ISP matrix, but with all entries reduced modulo 2. By our ISP definition
and by arguing the cases A 6∈ Tt,n using Remark 1, it follows that a binary
monotone span program for Tt,n is obtained in this way. The argument is
concluded by applying Theorem 1. 7 The statement about black-box secret
sharing follows from Proposition 1. This can also be seen without reference
to Proposition 1, by essentially the same argument as above. Namely, setting
G = Z2 in Definition 4, we clearly obtain a linear secret sharing scheme over
F2. As mentioned earlier, linear secret sharing schemes over a field K are
known to be essentially equivalent to monotone span programs over K.
4 Optimal Black-Box Threshold Secret Sharing
Theorem 2 For all t, n with 0 < t < n− 1, isp(Tt,n) = Θ(n · logn). Conse-
quently, there exists a black-box secret sharing scheme for Tt,n with expansion
factor O(log n), which is minimal.
Proof. By Proposition 1 it is sufficient to focus on the claim about the
ISPs. The lower bound follows from Proposition 2. For the upper bound,
consider a ring S = Z[X]/(f(X)), where f(X) ∈ Z[X] is a monic, irreducible
polynomial. Write m = deg(f), the degree of S over Z.
On account of Lemma 3, it is sufficient to exhibit a ring S together with
a monotone span programM over S for Tt,n such that the degree of S over
Z is O(log n) and size(M) = O(n).
The proof is organized as follows. We first identify a certain technical
property of a ring S that facilitates the construction of a monotone span
program over S for Tt,n, with size O(n). We finalize the proof by constructing
a ring S that enjoys this technical property, and that has degree O(log n)
over Z.
For x1, . . . , xn ∈ S, define







7See [Kin00, Kin01] for lower bounds on the randomness required in black-box secret
sharing schemes.
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Assume, for the moment, that there exist α1, . . . , αn ∈ S and r0, r1 ∈ S
such that
r0 ·∆(1, . . . , n)2 + r1 ·∆(α1, . . . , αn)2 = 1.
This assumption implies the existence of a monotone span program over
S for Tt,n with size 2n, as we now show. Write ∆0 = ∆(1, . . . , n) ∈ S and
∆1 = ∆(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ S. Let N0 ∈ Sn,t+1 (resp. N1 ∈ Sn,t+1) be the matrix
whose i-th row is (∆0, i, i2, . . . , it) (resp. (∆1, αi, α2i , . . . , α
t
i)), i = 1 . . . n. In
both cases, the ith row is labelled by i. When studied as possible monotone
span programs over S for Tt,n, N0 (resp. N1) satisfies Definition 6 for the sets
A 6∈ Tt,n. On the other hand, in both cases, the rows owned by a set A ∈ Tt,n
do not necessarily span the target vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ St+1. However, these
rows do span 8 the vector (∆20, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ St+1 (resp. (∆21, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ St+1).
Both properties stated can be verified immediately, for instance using the
well-known expression for a Vandermonde determinant in combination with
Cramér’s rule (see e.g. [Lang]); passing to the fraction field K of S (note
that S has no zero-divisors), this rule implies that a c × c linear system of
equations Nx = y over the ring S, has a solution at least in case where
y ∈ det(N) · Sc. Another way is by using Lagrange Interpolation over K,
and clearing denominators.
Define a new monotone span program matrix M ∈ S2n,2t+1 consisting of
all pairs of rows
(∆0, i, i2, . . . , it, 0, . . . , 0), and (∆1, 0, . . . , 0, αi, α2i , . . . , α
t
i),
for i = 1 . . . n. The shown padding consists of t zeroes in both cases, and
each of the rows in a pair is labelled by i. Define ε = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ S2t+1.
The sets A 6∈ Tt,n clearly satisfy Definition 6, and this time the rows owned
by sets A ∈ Tt,n span the target vector: they span in particular all vectors
of the form (r · ∆20 + s ·∆21, 0, . . . , 0), with r, s ∈ S. By setting r = r0 and
s = r1, these include the target vector ε.
To conclude, we exhibit a ring S with degree O(log n) over the integers
and α1, . . . , αn, r0, r1 ∈ S with r0 ·∆20 + r1 ·∆21 = 1, where ∆0 = ∆(1, . . . , n)
and ∆1 = ∆(α1, . . . , αn).
These conditions are reformulated as follows. Let Πn denote the set of
integer primes p with 2 ≤ p ≤ n and define Qn =
∏
p∈Πn p ∈ Z. Then we are
looking for a ring S with degreeO(log n) over the integers and α1, . . . , αn ∈ S
such that
∆1 ∈ (S/(Qn))∗,
8A similar property was first noticed and exploited in [FGKY97a, FGKY97b] and later
in [Sho00].
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i.e., the residue-class of ∆1 in the ring S/(Qn) is a unit.
Indeed, if ∆1 ∈ (S/(Qn))∗, then ∆1 ∈ (S/(Qkn))∗ as well, for any positive
integer k. To verify this by induction, suppose that ∆1 · v = 1 + w · Qin
for some v,w ∈ S and i ≥ 1: then ∆1 · (v − vw · Qin) = 1 − w2 · Q2in and
2i ≥ i + 1. As a consequence, ∆1 ∈ (S/(∆20))∗. Namely, as an integer, ∆20
factors completely over the primes p ∈ Πn. Then choose k∗ large enough
such that ∆20 divides Q
k∗
n , and apply the previous observation. It follows
that ∆21 ∈ (S/(∆20))∗ as well, or equivalently, there exist r0, r1 ∈ S such that
r0 ·∆20 + r1 ·∆21 = 1.
Set m = blog nc + 1. Let f̂(X) ∈ Z[X] be any monic, irreducible poly-
nomial of degree m such that for all p ∈ Πn, f̂p(X) (the polynomial f̂(X)
with its coefficients reduced modulo p) is irreducible in Fp[X].
One way of constructing such a polynomial is as follows. For all p ∈ Πn,
select a monic, irreducible polynomial f̂p(X) ∈ Fp[X] of degree m. By
the theory of finite fields, this is always possible. Applying the Chinese
Remainder Theorem to each of the coefficients separately, select an arbitrary
lift to a monic polynomial f̂(X) ∈ Z[X] of degree m such that f̂(X) ≡
f̂p(X) mod p. Note that the monic polynomial f̂(X) is irreducible in Z[X]:
if not, reduction modulo p with p ∈ Πn, gives a non-trivial factorization of
f̂p(X) in Fp[X].
Set S = Z[X]/(f̂ (X)). By definition of f̂(X), it follows that S/(p) is a
finite field, for all p ∈ Πn. Indeed, for all p ∈ Πn,
S/(p) ' Z[X]/(p, f̂ (X)) ' Fp[X]/(f̂p(X)) ' Fpm.
Note that all ideals (p) of S with p ∈ Πn are distinct and maximal. It





For all p ∈ Πn we have |F∗pm| = pm − 1 ≥ 2m − 1 ≥ n. Therefore, for each
p ∈ Πn, distinct non-zero
β
(p)
1 , . . . , β
(p)
n ∈ Fpm
can be selected. Finally, select arbitrary α1, . . . , αn ∈ S such that, for
i = 1 . . . n,





where the correspondence is via the (implicit) isomorphism. By construc-
tion, for all i, j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j, it holds that αi ∈ (S/(Qn))∗
and αi − αj ∈ (S/(Qn))∗. Hence, ∆1 ∈ (S/(Qn))∗, as desired. 4
Corollary 1 For all t, n with 1 ≤ t < n − 1, there exists an ISP of size
n · (blog nc+ 2) for Tt,n.
Proof. Let α1, . . . , αn, r0, r1 ∈ S be as constructed at the end of the
proof of Theorem 2, and consider the matrices N0 and N1 defined earlier
in the proof. Instead of applying Lemma 3 to the matrix M constructed
from them, apply it directly to N1. This leads to an ISP matrix N̂1 with
n · (blog nc+ 1) rows and 1 + t(blog nc+ 1) columns (take into account the
final remark of the proof of Lemma 3). Clearly, the sets A 6∈ Tt,n satisfy
Definition 6. For the sets A ∈ Tt,n, the rows owned by A span δ1 · ε̂, where
δ1 ∈ Z is the left-most coordinate of r1 ·∆21; before the “pruning” indicated at
the end of the proof of Lemma 3, these rows spanned all possible S-multiples
of ∆21 ·ε ∈ St+1 but written in integer coordinates, and after that, all except
the left-most among the m left-most coordinates have been removed.
As for the ISP matrix N0, note that it has the properties stated in the
proof also when studied over Z rather than S. Hence, the sets A 6∈ Tt,n also
satisfy Definition 6 over Z. For the sets A ∈ Tt,n, the rows owned by them
clearly span (δ0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zt+1, where δ0 ∈ Z is the left-most coordinate
of r0 · ∆20; ∆0 is an integer, so δ0 is simply the left-most coordinate of r0,
multiplied by ∆20. Since δ0 + δ1 = 1, this leads directly to an ISP for Tt,n,
where the ISP matrix has n·(blog nc+2) rows and t(blog nc+2)+1 columns.
4
5 Implementation and Concluding Remarks
We stress that in this paper we are primarily interested in the asymptotically
optimal result from Theorem 2. Several choices in its proof have been made
to simplify the mathematical exposition, while suppressing computational
aspects.
There are a number of possible practical implementations of black-box
secret sharing based on our result. We do not optimize its performance here,
but merely indicate below that straightforward implementations run in time
polynomial in n.
Note that the scheme consumes O(n log n) random coins (group ele-
ments) and that the expansion factor is O(log n) in any case, i.e., each player
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receives O(log n) groups elements as his share in a secret group element. For
an implementation, it is important to limit the necessary computational re-
sources for dealer and players.
One implementation is based on the well-known fact that for any fi-
nite Abelian group G, Gm can be viewed as a module over the ring S (see
also [DF94]). The multiplication of an element of S by an element of Gm
can be performed having only black-box access to the group operation of
G. This way, the monotone span program over S acts directly on vectors
of elements of Gm. This leads in a straightforward fashion to an attractive
implementation of black-box secret sharing where the actual ISP it is based
upon can be left implicit. See for instance [DF94] for the computational
details of this general procedure, taking into account the remarks below.
By the constructive method from the proof of Theorem 2, we may assume
without loss of generality that the coefficients of the polynomial f(X) have
bit length smaller than logQn ≤ log(n!) = O(n log n) bits. Recall that its
degree m is blog nc+ 1. For given threshold parameters t, n, it can be fixed
once and for all. One simple possible choice for the αi’s is to identify them
with distinct, non-zero integer polynomials of degree at most blog nc, such
that each of the coefficients is either 0 or 1. For instance, αi can point to i
by basing it on the bit representation of i. ∆20 is simply represented by an
integer with bit length O(n2 · log n). The value ∆21 is the product of O(n2)
elements of S, each of which has integer coordinates −1, 0 or 1. The values
r0 and r1 can be obtained by computing the inverse u of ∆
2
1 ∈ S/(∆20), for
instance by solving a linear system of equations over Z∆20, and by computing
u ·∆21 ∈ S. The reconstruction vectors are computed from r0, r1 and obvious
“interpolation coefficients” obtained from the αi’s.
Finally, the discussion above may seem to suggest that the notion of
black-box secret sharing can be generalized by replacing Z with an extension
ring in Definitions 3 and 4. However, using a conversion as in Lemma 3 this
boils down to the definition we have given. Moreover, we feel that conceptual
simplicity is better served by our current definition.
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